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CONTEMPORARY ADVOCACY:
VALUE-FREE?*
JOHN MCCARTHY QC**
What conclusions should be drawn about the nature of law and
its relationship to morality from consideration of Australian
cases since the High Court became Australia's ultimate appellate
authority?
This article argues that the connection between law and morality
in Australia is not contingent. It is of the essence of law and that
Australian law draws its validity from its moral purposes.
Moral concepts form a major part of common law discourse
which is a continuing and living tradition of application and re-
flection.
INTRODUCTION
Advocacy, in the common law tradition, is simply the plead-
ing of a cause before a court of justice. It is invariably under-
taken by a designated group of professional advocates. The law
reports record the judgments and arguments of the leading
cases, either directly or by reference. Being a record of the con-
temporary legal enterprise, the law reports are also a fair repre-
sentation of the manner in which judges and advocates think
about the nature of their role and the content and purpose of the
* This article was originally published in the AUSTRALIAN BAR REVIEW, 14
AUSTL. B. REV. 97 (1996). Minor technical revisions have been made in order to
more closely approximate the citation and formatting style of THE CATHOLIC
LAWYER. Reprinted with permission of the AUsTRALIAN BAR REVIEW.
"" The author is the President of the St. Thomas More Society, Sydney, Austra-
lia.
This article is based on a presentation made by the author at a Continuing Legal
Education seminar conducted by the New South Wales Bar Association in associa-
tion with the St. Thomas More Society and the Australian Lawyers Christian Fel-
lowship.
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rules and laws they apply. What conclusions should be drawn
about the nature of law, and its relationship to morality, from
considering Australian cases since the High Court became our
ultimate authority for both the general law and constitutional
law? It is submitted that the only reasonable conclusion is that
the connection between law and morality in Australia is not
contingent. It is the essence of law and that Australian law
draws its validity from its moral purposes.
Take out any volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports
during the last 10 years and peruse its pages at random. It is an
illuminating exercise. Any report perused will be full of such
terms as "natural justice," "unconscionable conduct,"
"fundamental principles of law," "corrupt conduct," "basis fair-
ness," "a fair and reasonable man," "reasonable expectations,"
"reasonable reliance," "protection of legitimate interests," "unfair
detriment." "unjust enrichment," "misleading and deceptive con-
duct." "murder," "fraud," "duty of care." "fundamental principles
of the common law." Professor P.D. Finn, as he then was, char-
acterises such language this way: "The evocative, and morally
judgmental, adjective is with us."'
These concepts provide the very stuff of advocacy by mem-
bers of the Australian bar. They are a part of the forensic ar-
mory of our profession. Such discourse has met with consider-
able success. In fact, it is more difficult to give instances where
morally neutral or value-free submissions have essentially suc-
ceeded.
MORAL PURPOSES AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
Clearly, moral concepts are a major part of common law dis-
course about justice and right order in society. Here, they have
force and potency because they are not disembodied but are a
part of a continuing tradition of application and reflection. In
fact, the common law, its principles and practices, is a notable
example of what a leading contemporary moral philosopher,
Alasdair McIntyre, would describe as a living tradition; being
one that is "historically extended" and "socially embodied."2 As
he so rightly stated, "moral concepts are embodied in and par-
' P.D. Finn, Commerce, The Common Law and Morality, 17 MULR 87, 92
(1989).
'M.A. Glendon, Tradition and Creativity in Culture and Law, FIRST THINGS,
No. 27, 13, 14 (1992).
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tially constitutive of forms of social life."3
When recently analyzing creativity and renewal in the com-
mon law, the influential Harvard Law Professor Mary Anne
Glendon commented:
[C]ommon law is an evolving body of principles built by accre-
tion from countless decisions in individual law suits. Because it
emerges from practice rather than theory, its principles are
highly fact-sensitive, and not too general. Continental law, by
contrast, had, as they say, the smell of the lamp-it was devel-
oped by scholars, and was further rationalized and systematized
by comprehensive legislative codifications.
What needs to be emphasized here are two remarkable features
of the common law tradition. First, its continuity. Over centu-
ries that saw the rise and fall of feudalism, the expansion of
commerce and the transition to constitutional monarchy, the
common law of England adapted to each new circumstance
without abrupt change or any root and branch reorganization of
the sort represented by the European codifications.
The second feature of the common law that must be stressed is
its distinctive methodology that enabled it to adapt and grow
while maintaining its continuity. To try to describe that method
is a bit like trying to describe swimming or bicycle riding, for it
consists of a set of habits and practices that are only acquired by
doing. But the conventional understanding goes something like
this: the common law judge is supposed to be a virtuoso of prac-
tical reason, weaving back and forth between facts and law,
striving not only for a fair disposition of the dispute at hand, but
to decide each case with reference to a principle that transcends
the facts of that case, all with a view toward maintaining conti-
nuity with past decisions, deciding like cases alike, and provid-
ing guidance for parties similarly situated in the future. It was
those sorts of operations that Lord Coke had in mind in the sev-
enteenth century when he famously said: "Reason is the life of
the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason."
To Coke, "reason" did not mean deductive reason (as it did for
Descartes), nor self-interested calculation (as it did for Hobbes).
It was, rather, an extended process of collaboration over time.
Or, as he put it himself, it was a kind of group achievement,
"gotten by long study, observation, and experience, ... fined and
refined over centuries by generations of grave and learned men
'A. McIntyre, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS (Routledge, United Kingdom 1989).
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"4
Professor Glendon concluded:
To be a traditionalist in such a tradition seems pretty clearly
not to be frozen in the past or mired in the status quo but rather
to participate as McIntyre puts it, in a community of intense
discourse about what it is that gives the tradition in question its
point and purpose."
Recently, when commenting on the Mason High Court, Pro-
fessor Leslie Zines remarked that "[t]he changes that have oc-
curred in the reasoning of the court must inevitably lead to
changes in the style of advocacy. Arguments as to 'policy' and
'values', once disguised under more legalistic forms, must now be
openly confronted.""
Given that context, it becomes unexceptional to suggest that
the dialectical processes involved in common law advocacy have
been overlooked by Professor Zines. The changes he referred to,
especially where he proposes that submissions about policies and
values should be undisguised, had already happened.
It is not as if, in any of these cases, counsel's submissions
had not suggested where justice might, lie and how the law
should evolve. The decisions of the High Court in recent years
have given such submissions the legitimacy of success. After all
there is more than an echo of the exchange between the bench
and bar in the court's finely honed reasoning about values and
policies in our law. Those exchanges are critical to common law
judgments avoiding, to use Professor Glendon's words, "the smell
of the lamp."7 Moreover, those cases did not commence in the
High Court, which, in any event, is not the, initiator of the causes
before it, except in the sense of its control of the special leave
procedure.
LAW AND MORAL PURPOSES: LORD ATKIN
Two of the most influential statements in the common law
tradition this century are meditations on law as a reflection of
moral and social responsibility. Firstly, of course, Lord Atkin in
' Glendon, supra note 2, at 14.
5Id.
6 Leslie Zines, Most Significant Case of the Mason High Court, AUSTL. LAW. 18,
21 (June 1995).
7 Glendon, supra note 2, at 14.
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Donoghue v. Stevenson' and to the best known passage in all
twentieth century English law:
At present I content myself with pointing out that in English
law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations
giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found
in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence,
whether you style it such or treat it as a species of "culpa", is no
doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdo-
ing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions
which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world
be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them
to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the
range of complaints and the extent of their remedy. The rule
that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must
not injure your neighbour; and the lawyers question "Who is my
neighbour?" receives a restricted reply. You must take reason-
able care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in
law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be-persons who
are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought rea-
sonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are
called in question.'
The second statement, also by Lord Atkin, in Liversidge v.
Anderson, ° was a similar reasoned appeal to the moral imagina-
tion of common lawyers. The vast expansion, indeed revolution,
in administrative law since World War II had part of its genesis,
in this statement. Lord Atkin proclaimed:
In this country, amid the clash of arms the laws are not silent.
They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war
as in peace. It has always been one of the pillars of freedom,
one of the principles of liberty for which on recent authority we
are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of persons
and stand between the subject and any attempted encroach-
ments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coer-
cive action is justified in law. In this case I have listened to ar-
guments which might have been addressed acceptably to the
Court of King's Bench in the time of Charles I.
I protest, even if I do it alone, against a strained construction
8 (1932) AC 562.A Id. at 580.
'0 (1942) AC 206.
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put on words with the effect of giving an uncontrolled power of
imprisonment to the minister. To recapitulate: The words have
only one meaning. They are used with that meaning in state-
ments of the common law and in statutes. They have never
been used in the sense now imputed to them....
I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested
method of construction: "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty
said in rather a scornful tone, 'it "'means just what I choose it to
mean, neither more no" less.' 'The question is' said Alice,
'whether you can "'make words mean so many different things.'
'The question "'is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be mas-
ter-that's"all.'" (Through the Looking Glass, c vi) After all
this long discussion the question is whether the words "If a man
has" can mean "If a man thinks he has." I am of opinion that
they cannot, and that the case should be decided accordingly. 1
This Australian-born Law Lord is, perhaps, the most revered
figure of this century amongst the Anglo-Commonwealth legal
profession. Donoghue v. Stevenson has probably been the most
influential statement of the common law and of its fundamental
principles. Succeeding generations of lawyers have debated,
criticised, sought to apply, limit or refine Lord Atkin's statement.
The late Professor Julius Stone might have effectively shown
that some of the reasoning of Lord Atkin or Lord McMillan ("The
categories of negligence are never closed.") 12 were, in some ways,
categories of illusory reference. 3 However, what Professor Stone
would never deny is that Lord Atkin captured and distilled a vi-
sion of common law obligation. A vision which has excited and
inspired the imagination of lawyers in our tradition ever since.
It also steadied lawyers as to the purposes of law and sign-
posted what Professor Ronald Dworkin would later call "Law's
Empire." 4
It is fair to say that for many at the bar or on the bench,
Lord Atkin's famous statements have become almost a vocational
charter. Lord Atkin's statements have become embedded in the
collective imagination and memory of the legal profession. It is
significant that Lord Atkin's biographer observes, "[h]e had thus
come to see the field of civil wrongs and legal liability for care-
" Id. at 244-45 (quotation marks as in original).
12 (1932) AC 552 at 619.
'3 See J. Stone, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONING 277-78 (Maitland
Publications Pty. Ltd., Sydney 1968).
" R. Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE (Fontana Press 1986).
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lessness as depending on moral obligation.""
LAW AND MORALITY: SIR GERARD BRENNAN
The connection between law and morality has also been ex-
pressed forcefully by our new Chief Justice, Sir Gerard Brennan:
In many areas, law and morality work in a symbiotic relation-
ship. This is especially true of the general criminal law, which
would hardly be enforceable if the common moral values of the
community were at odds with the law's prescriptions. In tort
also, a close relationship of law and morality can be per-
ceived... it is desirable that the dichotomy between law and
morals be steadily borne in mind in determining the content of
each. Law which is the subject of our professional concern does
not mirror all the tenets of morality. Nor should it try to do so.
The coercive power of the State must be reserved to the en-
forcement of those moral principles which, by a broad commu-
nity consensus, enjoy recognition and acceptance and which
need to be expressed as universal binding rules in order to fa-
cilitate a peaceful, ordered, just but free society.
The stimulus which moral values provide in the development of
legal principle is hard to overstate, though the importance of the
moral matrix to the development of judge-made law is seldom
acknowledged. Sometimes the impact of the moral matrix is
obvious, as when notions of unconscionability determine a case.
More often the influence of common moral values goes unre-
marked. But whence does the law derive its concepts of reason-
able care, of a duty to speak, of the scope of constructive
trusts-to name a few examples-save from moral values
translated into legal precepts? How often do we see the con-
struction of a statute turn on an intention of the legislature im-
puted by reference to a moral value? 16
Brennan C.J. has also stated:
As legal transactions become more complex, the input of moral-
ity--or policy, for in this context the terms are interchange-
able-will increase inevitably, for morality furnishes the refer-
ence points of legal development.
Whether the development of law is in a direction of new rules or
"G. Lewis, LORD ATKIN 58 (Butterworths, London 1983).
16 Sir Gerard Brennan, Commercial Law and Morality, 17 MULR 100, 101
(1989).
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the broadening or loosening of existing rules, morality has a
part to play.
Before morality can be employed by judges to inform legal prin-
ciple, the particular moral imperative must exhibit certain
characteristics. I have already mentioned one characteristic: a
broad consensus for recognition and acceptance. Such an im-
perative is easily translated into a legal precept for it represents
a common community value. Law, the binding cement of soci-
ety, simply adds the coercive powers of the State to the value
which the community has accepted. And thus the crimes which
stir the community to moral outrage become the more heinous
crimes in the calendar. At the discretionary level, we may note
that the heaviest penalties are imposed where the moral sense
of the community is most deeply offended. 17
His Honour further stated:
The second characteristic of moral imperatives which inform the
law is that they relate-for the most part-to personal morality.
By that I mean the kind of ethical standards by which people
live in their personal, as distinct from their public, lives. These
are familiar standards. We do not deliberately set out to inflict
physical harm on our neighbour or to damage his land or his
possessions; when we foresee that harm or damage might hap-
pen, we take care to avoid causing it; we do not try to deceive or
defraud people with whom we deal; we do not engage in cal-
umny or detraction of another. These ethical standards are the
stuff of the law of torts. Equally with the criminal law: murder,
rape, offences against the person, larceny. There are few crimes
which have what might be called the public element in
them.. .By referring to standards of personal morality, I do not
mean to imply that personal morality is, or ought to be seen as,
private morality in which the public can have no interest. Per-
haps there is no area of morality more personal than that which
effects consensual sexual relations, yet the public interest and
the health consequences of sexual activity is manifest. In one
sense, I suppose all morality is a matter of profound public in-
terest for the strength of a nation cannot survive the moral
decadence of its people. But the point of present relevance is
that public interest is seldom an element in the immediate cir-
cumstances which give rise to the moral standards which are
translated into law.
The moral standards of personal life apply, generally speaking,
17 Id. at 101-02.
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to situations where the consequences of their non-observance
are immediate or clearly foreseeable by the person who engages
in the forbidden conduct. This is reflected in judge made law.'8
His Honour continued:
In the general law which is informed by moral imperatives
these imperatives can be identified: general recognition and ac-
ceptance, applicability of the standard to one's own conduct in
personal living and immediacy or foreseeability of the conse-
quences of non-observance. These three characteristics facili-
tate the translation of a moral imperative into a legal precept. ' 9
LAWYERS: THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO ADVISE ON THE MORAL
PURPOSES OF LAW
However, the moral purposes behind the commercial law are
not always self-evident. This factor has important consequences
for the legal profession in the practice of commercial law. Sir
Gerard Brennan said:
[Allthough the complexity of much commercial law hides the
underlying moral purpose so that that purpose is not immedi-
ately revealed by reference to the community's general set of
personal moral values, the commercial lawyer must search for
the moral purpose by ascertaining the operation of the law he or
she practises.
20It is not a light burden.
His Honour also stated:
The hidden morality of much of the commercial law and the
traditional role of the lawyer as the advisor on law alone, raises
peculiar difficulties for the commercial lawyer.
Because the moral purpose of much commercial law is known to
or ascertainable by commercial lawyers alone, the commercial
lawyer becomes by default the moral as well as the legal advisor
to the client. There is nobody else to be the moral advisor. The
role sits somewhat uneasily on a lawyer's shoulders. Yet it
must be accepted if professional advice is to avoid the reproach
of being the solvent of the client's moral responsibility. How of-
ten does one hear the financial journalist who, seeking to em-
barrass a captain of commerce, is met with the disarming re-
sponse: "We took the best advice and what we did is entirely
is Id. at 102-03.
19 Id. at 103.
20 Id. at 104.
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lawful." Yet legality and morality are not interchangeable
terms and both are appropriate fields for advice by the well
furnished commercial lawyer.. .If the client is merely advised
that such a transaction is legally valid, he may fail to consider
whether it is morally objectionable.
In a case where the underlying moral purpose of the law on
which advice is given is not and perhaps cannot be perceived by
the client unless the lawyer tells him, the commercial lawyer's
duty cannot be restricted to legal advice, for then the moral de-
cision-what ought to be done as distinct from what can law-
fully be done-will not be addressed. If the lawyer alone knows
the moral dimension of the decision to be made, it is morally
unacceptable for him to be silent. If he perceives it is within the
client's legal power to impair the rights of a third party whom
the legislature has ineffectually tried to protect or to exercise
that legal power in a way that is unjust, surely the moral di-
mension must be pointed out. "
As Sir Gerard then pointedly asks: "[sihould a lawyer do for
a client what he would not do as a person?""
The ethical issues for any lawyer required to tender such
advice therefore can also raise questions about the participation
with a client in any such activity. Brennan C.J. moreover raises
an issue about the provision of extra-legal services in such cir-
cumstances. In all these ways, this seems to be a far cry from
advising on the law in some value-free context. Legal profes-
sional responsibilities entail moral responsibilities. In our time,
to be a lawyer of integrity requires that a practitioner be a moral
agent and a teacher of moral conduct. Not only must a lawyer
follow the first precept of practical reason, do good and avoid
evil, but clients, and colleagues, must be warned to do likewise if
the moral purposes of the law are to be fulfilled.
MORAL PURPOSE AND THE JUDICIAL OATH OF OFFICE
These duties are also consistent with the fact that the very
constitution of our courts manifests an immediate moral dimen-
sion. A person cannot become a judge without making, either by
oath or affirmation, two avowals to the community. One is a
pledge of allegiance and the other is a promise as to conduct.
This is the promise "to do right to all manner of people according
21 Id. at 104-5.
22 Id. at 105.
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to law without fear or favour, affection or ill will." So the judicial
promise is to do right. The opposite of right is wrong. These are
moral categories. So the carrying out of moral duties does not
cease when a lawyer is appointed to the bench, even if the judi-
cial oath to do right is structured by an explicit standard: accord-
ing to law. Surely it is morally wrong for instance, for a judge to
be partisan, partial and susceptible to improper influences when
deciding a cause. These moral failings may have legal conse-
quences; the judgment may be set aside.
IS AN UNJUST LAW, LAW?
The judicial oath attempts to secure for our community the
rule of law; but it has a corollary which Sir Gerard Brennan un-
derlined at his swearing in as Chief Justice, when he said, "[i]f
right is to be done according to law, right will be done only if the
law be just.""
Where the source of the perceived injustice is the common
law, Brennan J., as he then was, in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) 2
held:
The peace and order of Australian society is built on the legal
system. It can be modified to bring it into conformity with con-
temporary notions of justice and human rights, but it cannot be
destroyed. It is not possible, a priori, to distinguish between
cases that express a skeletal principle and those which do not,
but no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it
expresses seriously offends the values of justice and human
rights (especially equality before the law) which are aspirations
of the contemporary Australian legal system. If a postulated
rule of the common law expressed in earlier cases seriously of-
fends those contemporary values, the question arises whether
the rule should be maintained and applied. Whenever such a
question arises, it is necessary to assess whether the particular
rule is an essential doctrine of our legal system and whether, if
the rule were to be overturned, the disturbance to be appre-
hended would be disproportionate to the benefit flowing from
the overturning.'
More recently, in Dietrich v. R, 2 his Honour stated:
(1995) 69 ALJ 679, 680.
24 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
Id. at 30.
21 (1992) 177 CLR 292.
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Where a common law rule requires some expansion or modifi-
cation in order to operate more fairly or efficiently, this Court
will modify the rule provided no injustice is done thereby. And,
in those exceptional cases where a rule of the common law pro-
duces a manifest injustice, this Court will change the rule so as
to avoid perpetuating the injustice.
The contemporary values which justify judicial development of
the law are not the transient notions which emerge in reaction
to a particular event or which are inspired by a publicity cam-
paign conducted by an interest group. They are the relatively
permanent values of the Australian community.
In his swearing-in speech, the Chief Justice further reflected
on some of the principles involved in the judicial development of
law:
Judicial method is not concerned with the ephemeral opinions of
the community. The law is most needed when it stands against
popular attitudes, sometimes engendered by those with power-
and when it protects the unpopular against the clamor of the
multitude. But judicial method is concerned with the equal
dignity of every person, his or her capacity to participate in the
life of the community, to contribute to society and to share in its
benefits; it is concerned with the powers entrusted to govern-
ments and the manner in which those powers are exercised.
Judicial method starts with an understanding of the existing
rules; it seeks to perceive the principle that underlies them and,
at a deeper level, the values that underlie the principle. At the
appellate level, analogy and experience, as well as logic, have a
part to play. Judgments must be principled, reasoned and ob-
jective, as Sir Anthony Mason said yesterday. And, most sig-
nificantly, each step in the reasoning must be exposed to public
examination and criticism. 28
The remarks of the new Chief Justice of Australia serve to
confirm that, ultimately, in our courts, the validity of any legal
rule will be sought in terms of its purposes and consequences. If
the justification for any given principle or rule of law is inade-
quate, then that rule may be subject to alteration by an appellate
27 Id. at 319.
28 69 Ali at 680-81. Brennan C.J., considered that issues about the justice of a
law are more significant in appellate courts: "In the trial courts of this country, the
rules of law prevail. And so they must, for it would do no justice to give judgment
according to an abstract notion of what is right in the knowledge that the judgment
would be overruled on appeal." Id. at 680.
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court. In other words, it is the validity as well as the application
of any existing principle which is subject to the judicial method.
It is not a process whereby the existing law may be taken for
granted, in some sovereign sense, and simply applied regardless
of its consequences. As the content of any existing rule may be
the subject of refinement or alteration, the purpose or moral ob-
ject of that rule or principle must be always an important ingre-
dient in its continued validity.
As Mr. Justice Young of the New South Wales Supreme
Court has said about the Brennan C.J.'s remarks:
Gone are the days when one could merely construe words used
in an Act of Parliament according to their semantic significance
or merely apply a principle of equity or the common law simply
because it was there in the textbook. One now looks to the
principles behind the words. One looks to the legal history and
evolution of the rules of equity and the common law. One looks
to the purpose of the statute often found in the Second Reading
Speech of the Minister who introduced the relevant Bill into
Parliament.
This is of course no new principle, most judges have been apply-
ing this principle over the last 20 years. It is good to see the
Chief Justice of Australia enunciating the thought so clearly at
this important moment in his distinguished career. 9
MORAL PURPOSES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN LAW
What have been the effects for Australian law of drawing
purpose from morality? As Professor Finn so admirably sum-
marised:
Contract law is in evolution, if not (to some) in revolution. The
unconscionable dealings doctrine is resurgent; consideration is
under siege; privity has taken a mortal blow; the mistake rules
are being revitalised with their limits as yet unsettled. The
implication and interpretation of contractual terms seem set fair
for some reappraisal; relief against forfeiture is in a state of ex-
pansive uncertainty; and the last word has not yet been said on
penalties. The doctrine of "good faith" in contract performance
is now squarely upon contract's agenda; and we have the im-
pact, direct and indirect, of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
and its State equivalents with which to contend.
29 (1995) 69 ALJ at 473.
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Equity, the sometimes moral policeman of the law, has been one
significant force in this re-shaping of contract. But in its renais-
sance in Australia it has gone well beyond contract. Equitable
estoppel has been transformed; the unconscionability principle
(as distinct merely from the specific unconscionable dealings
doctrine) is becoming as imperialistic in equity as the neigh-
bourhood principle is in tort law; breach of confidence has won
unequivocal acceptance; the fiduciary principle is resurgent, al-
beit measuredly in some instances; the constructive trust is be-
ing liberated from its historical shackles; and the inherent ju-
risdiction to award damages prospers again. One could go on.
In yet another sphere we are witnessing the likely emergence of
a law of unjust enrichment (or restitution). Whether it will
prove to be the Siamese twin of the unconscionability principle
remains to be seen. It heralds, for example, a change of position
defence in the law. And quantum meruit for its part has been
openly acknowledged to be a restitutionary remedy. 30
30 Finn, supra note 1, at 88-89. The cases and articles referred in footnotes by
Professor Finn are as follows:
Cases: Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. v. Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; West-
pac Banking Corp. v. Clemesha (SC(NSW), Cole J., 29 July 1988, unreported); Wal-
tons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; Trident General Insur-
ance Co. Ltd. v. McNiece Bros. Pty. Ltd. (1988) 165 CLR 107; Taylor v. Johnson
(1983) 151 CLR 422; Easyfile (NSW) Pty. Ltd. v. Paterson (1987) 11 NSWLR 98;
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. Carlton and United Breweries Ltd. (1987) 10 NSWLR
468; Australian Coarse Grains Pool Pty. Ltd. v. Barley Marketing Board (SC(QLD),
Kelly SPJ, 22 February 1988, unreported; the decision in which was reversed by the
Full Court, and special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was granted);
Stern v. McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489; Amev-UDC Finance Ltd. v. Austin (1986)
162 CLR 178; Esanda Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Plessnig (1989) 166 CLR 131; Amann
Aviation Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth 174 CLR 64 (1988); 80 ALR 35; Qantas Airways
Ltd. v. Dillingham Corp. (1988) ACLD 692; Silovi Pty. Ltd. v. Barbaro (1988) 13.
NSWLR 466; Collin v. Holden (1988) ACLD 642; Waverley Transit Pty. Ltd. v. Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority (1988) ACLD 524; Verwayen v. Commonwealth (1988)
ATR 80-222 (see now Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394); Orr v. Ford
(1989) 167 CLR 316; Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; Moorgate
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Professor Finn then commented on the new directions in
Australian common law:
[Tihere is an evident change in the standards of conduct which
the law is exacting from persons in their voluntary or consen-
sual dealings with others. Putting the matter in a very general
way for the moment, I suggest it can rightly be said that we are
witnessing a partial shift (though of marked consequence) in the
ideology which is forming much legal doctrine. Associated with
this is an emerging tendency to formulate some range of doc-
trines, not in terms of distinct, limited and discrete rules of be-
haviour, but as generalised standards of conduct which in a con-
trolled way are instance-specific in their application. '
Professor Finn justified this from the historical perspective
of the late nineteenth century when individualism and self-
reliance were the endorsed virtues of the common law.
For the nineteenth century and much of this century, Pro-
fessor Finn concluded:
Importantly, in all of this, the law would not mend hard bar-
gains save in the most gross of cases. Superior knowledge and
superior power were advantages which could be exploited. In
this environment, caveat emptor could flourish. As Blackburn
J. was to observe in Smith v. Hughes "whatever may be the case
in a court of morals, there is no legal obligation on [a] vendor to
inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake, not induced by
the act of the vendor." In this environment, the now brutal-
sounding view of Wills J. is that "any right given by contract
may be exercised against the giver by the person to whom it is
granted, no matter how wicked, cruel or mean, the motive may
be which determines the enforcement of the right."3 2
As to our contemporary scene, Professor Finn observed:
Today though not all willingly, we are marching to a different
drum. As Sir Robin Cooke (President of the New Zealand Court
of Appeal) has observed. Legal obligation is being asked to
match 'the now pervasive concepts of duty to a neighbour and
the linking of power with obligation'. Individualism has to ac-
commodate itself to a new concern: the idea of "neighbourhood" -
a moral idea of positive and not merely negative requisition - is
abroad.
The legal genesis of one's duty to a neighbour was, of course, in
31 Finn, supra note 1, at 90.
32 Id. at 91.
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tort law in Lord Atkin's judgment in Donoghue v. Stevenson. It
was there acknowledged that though the requirements of a
practical world restricted its scope, it was "based on a general
public sentiment of moral wrongdoing". Powerful in its effect
upon the legal imagination, the idea it encapsulates permeates
our law. In its imperative that in society we must be responsi-
ble to or for others, it seems to be leading us inexorably to some
commitment to the view that we must demonstrate, "good faith
and fair dealin" [sic] in our relationships with others. 3
There are common law doctrines which require disclosure in
business and related dealings. However, the most potent law
now in Australia is Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52, and its
equivalent in state and territory Fair Trading Acts, of which Pro-
fessor Finn states that "[it promises to be the central force in
the expansion of duties 'to speak' in business dealings. " 34
The entitlement to insist on one's apparent strict legal rights
is undergoing progressive curtailment through the unconscion-
ability principle. Such rights are now being assessed in a con-
text of concern for relational factors, that is the actual conduct of
parties in the relationship, the known assumptions upon which
one or both of them act, which make it unfair and unjust for one
party to act in a particular way notwithstanding the formal right
to do so. 3' The developments in the doctrine of equitable estoppel
in Commonwealth v. Verwayen36  and Waltons Stores
(International) Ltd. v. Maher" suggests that this is now the case.
Waltons Stores (International) Ltd. v. Maher provides perhaps
the most systematic recognition of imposed obligations of fair
dealing arising from the actual circumstances of one's relation-
ship with another. It also reflects closely both the injury avert-
ing concern and the moral ethos of the neighbourhood principle
in the law of negligence.38
In sum, clients may be unwittingly committed to legal pro-
ceedings if proposed actions or arrangements have not been the
subject of legal advice or assessment which includes:
(a) Whether the relationship, in either the public sector or
private sector, between the parties creates any vulnerability in
aId. at 92.
4 Id. at 93.
sSee id. at 96.
so (1990) 170 CLR 394.
37 (1988) 164 CLR 387.
so See Finn, supra note 1, at 96.
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the other party.
(b) Whether such vulnerability includes disparities in infor-
mation about the issues, the relative power of the parties so that
the other party may be prejudicially affected by the encourage-
ment or silence of the client.
(c) Whether any vulnerability of the other party has been ef-
fectively addressed and therefore can be regarded as a legitimate
assumption of commercial or personal risk, specifically in arm's
length commercial negotiations, so that the client may have the
moral entitlement to rely on the basic contractual principle pacta
sunt servanda.39
(d) Whether there are any other factors which may morally
disentitle the client from reliance on established legal rights.
IS AN UNJUST STATUTE, LAW?
What are the implications for our system of law if the source
of a perceived injustice in a case is an Act of parliament? Earlier
generations and some contemporary judges would find a simple
response in the Austinian-Benthamite theory that law is the
command or will of the sovereign: in our system, parliament.
Therefore, an Act of parliament, regardless of its content, is to be
given effect according to its tenor. As Willes J., once sharply ob-
served, "laicts of Parliament ... are the law of this land; we do
not sit as a court of appeal from parliament."' °
During the last 10 years, cases have arisen involving both
state and federal legislation in which it was claimed that such
legislation, in whole or in part, is invalid as undermining fun-
damental human rights or common law rights.41 In 1988, the
High Court left the issue seemingly open-ended in the Union
Steamship Co. (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. King: 2
Just as the courts of the United Kingdom cannot invalidate laws
made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom on the ground
that they do not secure the welfare and the public interest, so
the exercise of its legislative power by the Parliament of New
'9 See Lam v. Ausintel Investments Australia Pty. Ltd. (1989) 97 FLR 458;
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84. Pacta sunt ser-
vanda: agreements must be kept.
40 Lee v. Bude and Torrington Junction Railway Co. (1871) LR 6 CP 576, 582.
"' See, e.g., Building Construction and Builders' Labourers' Federation of New
South Wales v. Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372.
42 (1988) 166 CLR 1.
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South Wales is not susceptible to judicial review on that score.
Whether the exercise of that legislative power is subject to some
restraints by reference to rights deeply rooted in our democratic
system of government and the common law (see Drivers v. Road
Carriers; Fraser v. State Services Commission; Taylor v. New
Zealand Poultry Board), a view which Lord Reid firmly rejected
in Pickin v. British Railways Board, is another question which
we need not explore.'
Since then, for federal legislation, the High Court has shown
that it is prepared to make such explorations. A clear majority
of the High Court justices have posited implied rights or restric-
tions on legislative power from the nature of our community as
parliamentary democracy with separation of powers and re-
sponsible government under the rule of law. Legislation has
been invalidated which unduly trenched upon freedom of politi-
cal discourse implied in the structure of the Australian constitu-
tion, although such freedom was not absolute. There has
emerged in subsequent cases a wide power to review whether
legislation is valid or invalid. In this way, an implied bill of
rights may evolve. Subsequent to Australian Capital Television
v. Commonwealth" and Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills,"'
Toohey J. has stated:
Yet it might be contended that the courts should take the issue
a step higher and conclude that where the people of Australia,
in adopting a constitution, conferred power to legislate with re-
spect to various subject matters upon a Commonwealth Parlia-
ment, it is to be presumed that they did not intend that those
grants of power extend to invasion of fundamental common law
liberties -- a presumption only rebuttable by express authorisa-
tion in the constitutional document.
Just as Parliament must make unambiguous the expression of
its legislative will to permit executive infringement of funda-
mental liberties before the courts will hold that it has done so, it
might be considered that the people must make unambiguous
the expression of their constitutional will to permit Parliament
to enact such laws before the courts will hold that those laws
are valid.
If such an approach to constitutional adjudication were adopted,
Id. at 10.
Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.
CONTEMPORARY ADVOCACY
the courts would over time articulate the content of the limits
on power arising from fundamental common law liberties and it
would then be a matter for the Australian people whether they
wished to amend their Constitution to modify those limits. In
that sense, an implied "bill of rights" might be constructed. '
As to the present role of the judiciary, Toohey J. concluded:
Some principles are fundamental and it is the role of an inde-
pendent judiciary to give effect to those principles, within the
rule of law, as best it can. Thus, although the relationship in
our society between the authority of the legislature and the rule
of law fluctuates over the course of time, the rule of law is the
dominant factor in the relationship. This explains the efficacy
of the rule of law as a means both of protection against the mis-
use of legislation and executive Fower and of promotion of fun-
damental rights and principles. 4
There has been no such development in respect of state par-
liaments and state appellate courts. In no case has a statute
been invalidated, in whole or in part, as a misuse of legislative
power and inconsistent with human rights. Such a submission
was made in Building Construction Employees and Builders' La-
bourers' Federation of New South Wales v. Minister for Industrial
Relations' in 1986 and again in 1995 in Kable v. Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions,"9 proceedings concerning the Community Pro-
tection Act 1994 (NSW).
This statute allowed a judge to make a preventive detention
order in appropriate circumstances in relation to one person, Mr.
Kable. The legislation was attacked as inconsistent with implied
human rights on which the Australian constitution and the in-
herited structure of the government of New South Wales are
based. Mahoney J.A., while having significant misgivings about
the legislation, nevertheless found:
Such implications do not, of their nature, apply to legislation
passed by the New South Wales Parliament. That Parliament
is, subject to the Constitution, a sovereign parliament exercising
plenary powers. It would in my opinion be wrong, in reliance
upon conceptual considerations as to the nature of legislation or
"Justice John Toohey, A Government of Law and Not of Men, speech delivered
at Conference on Constitutional Change of the 1990s, Darwin, October 1992, at 25-
26.
41 Id. at 33.
(1986) 7 NSWLR 372.
" (1995) 36 NSWLR 374.
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the form of parliamentary enactments, to restrict the form of
legislation which may be passed by a sovereign parliament. Ex-
perience has shown that circumstances may arise in which leg-
islation in a special form will be needed for the public good. It is
not, in my opinion, for the courts, upon conceptual or similar
bases, to seek to impose restrictions upon what such a parlia-
ment may do. Parliamentary power is, in the end, a legal last
resort: it is the power which, failing all others, will be available
to deal with such special cases as may arise. Compelling rea-
sons indeed would be necessary to justify the assumption by the
courts of the power to impose limits to what such a body may do.
In my opinion, such implications are not to be drawn. The
power of a State parliament to alter even fundamental aspects
of its constitutional structure is well established. Reference was
made in argument to the abolition by the Parliament of Queen-
sland of the second House of the Parliament. It was suggested
by some judges of this Court that the New South Wales Parlia-
ment may possibly not be able to enact legislation inconsistent
with certain human rights: see Building Construction Employ-
ees and Builders' Labourers Federation of New South Wales v.
Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372 at 378,
385, 406, 407, 411-413, 420 et seq.; and the comments of the
High Court in Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty. Ltd.
v. King (1988) 166 CLR 1 at 9-10. If there be limits upon what a
sovereign State may do in this regard, the present Act does not
in my opinion go beyond them: cf. S v. The Queen (Supreme
Court of Western Australia, 3 February 1995, unreported). 50
Clarke and Sheller J.J.A. agreed with Mahoney J.A., Clarke
J.A. stating:
The position in which the court finds itself is relatively straight-
forward, notwithstanding that the Act presents to me as, prima
facie, an unjustified infringement of the appellant's basic hu-
man rights. If the Act is valid the court is bound to enforce it.
The primary question is whether the law is valid. "'
Perhaps in respect of issues concerning the invalidity of a
statute trenching on a fundamental principle of the common law
or human rights or otherwise, any judicial role may be limited,
as yet, to the High Court. The Chief Justice of New South Wales
recently cautioned:
60 id. at 387-88.51 Id. at 395.
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Judges are unelected and, from most points of view, relatively
unaccountable. Their independence and unaccountability are
appropriate to the judicial role but they are inappropriate to a
quasi-legislative role.. .This is not to assert that there is no room
for principled development of the law by appropriate judicial
lawmaking. Of course there is. But, as a rule, acceptable judi-
cial lawmaking is incremental, and involves development of es-
tablished principle. There is a limit to the extent to which a
democratic community will accept lawmaking by people who are
not obliged to submit to the accountability of the political proc-
ess. 52
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the fundamental rights ad-
vocacy of the last 10 years has affected judicial perspectives.
The strict Austinian-Diceyian parliamentary supremacy position
is in retreat.
Kable's case notwithstanding, there are few in the legal pro-
fession who believe that in the present Australian judicial para-
digm, Mahoney J.A.'s "compelling circumstances," a 1990s statu-
tory equivalent of the Herodian "all blue-eyed babies shall be
killed at dawn" would not be struck down in the courts as an
abuse of legislative power.' Similarly a law, however disguised,
which in effect appointed a party as his or her own judge in a
particular dispute or category of cases would seem inevitably
tending to a similar fate of being declared null and void.
In the future, it will become important to the development of
this new constitutional jurisdiction," that the independence of
82 The Honourable A.M. Gleeson, Individualised Justice-The Holy Grail (1995)
69 AIJ 421, 432.
Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions 75 A Crim R 428, 435 at first instance
before Spender A.J., where his Honour referred to the BLF Case:
...Priestly J.A. quoted this extract from Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (9th edition 1939) at p. 81: "If a
legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the pres-
ervation of blue eyed babies would be illegal; but legislators must go mad
before they can pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they could
submit to it." Priestly J.A. thought it was at least arguable that such an ex-
traordinary and evil law could never be said to be for the peace, welfare
and good government of New South Wales; Kirby P. (at 406) referred to
this question: Glass J.A. reserved his position on it. For my part, I would
go further: it would seem to me that such a law could not possibly be said
to be for the peace, welfare.. .and good government of New South Wales.
In the BLF Case, 7 NSWLR at 387, Street C.J. said:
For my own part, I prefer to look to the constitutional constraints of
"peace, welfare, and good government" as the source of power in the courts
to exercise an ultimate authority to protect our parliamentary democracy,
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the judiciary and the separation of the judiciary from parliament
has been given an explicit constitutional framework, with the
passage of the recent referendum on judicial offices.55 It would
be within this now entrenched constitutional framework and
with the advantage of High Court reasoning on legislative inva-
sion of fundamental common law rights that New South Wales
legislation would be reviewed. It is fair to anticipate that the
New South Wales Court of Appeal will contribute to the devel-
opment of an "implied" bill of rights in Australia.
CONCLUSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR ADVOCATES
Any principle or rule of law draws its validity only from its
moral content and purpose and is there by a just law. This
should become, for any practitioner, a fundamental professional
perspective. It means being alert to the wider ramifications of
past actions and proposed future conduct or arrangements by
clients. It means being prepared both morally and intellectually
to give advice, where appropriate, that a client's proposed course
of conduct is at law morally unacceptable and should not be pur-
sued. It may also mean jeopardising a continued relationship
with a client. Not being prepared to equivocate and approve
proposed conduct especially for large or long-term clients may
have financially detrimental consequences. But a value-free ap-
proach is simply impossible; giving legal advice will not be the
issue or at least not the whole issue.
If government agencies or large corporations or wealthy and
powerful individuals are involved, the dilemma for a practitioner
may escalate. Professional standards, integrity and conscience
become paramount. It is then that other parts of our tradition
become important. The most drastic and immortal instance of
conscience and integrity is St. Thomas More. His famous words,
as he went to the block, condemned to death by Henry VIII after
not only against tyrannous excesses on the part of a legislature that may
have fallen under extremist control, but also in a general sense as limiting
the power of Parliament. I repeat what I have said earlier-laws inimical
to, or which do not serve, the peace, welfare, and good government of our
parliamentary democracy, perceived in the sense I have previously indi-
cated, will be struck down by the courts as unconstitutional. There is here
a field of constitutional jurisprudence which has not yet been explored and
developed. It may well become significant in the years ahead.
' Referendum on Judicial Offices. Constitution (Amendment) Act 1992 (NSW),
confirmed by referendum on 25th March, 1995.
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a travesty of a trial, still ring down the centuries for all lawyers
with a conscience and powerful enemies: "I die the King's good
servant but God's first." Let us hope and pray that the stakes
would never be that high: in the words of the Pater Noster: "sed
libera nos a malo."N
In respect of any cause of action in which counsel is briefed
for advice and evidence, it may well be that within whatever
category of case, for example contracts, torts, trade practices,
administrative law that a case may fall, it might initially be re-
garded as straight forward. However, when all of the factors
concerning validity of a law or rule or its application are consid-
ered as outlined earlier, it may no longer seem to be straight
forward. It may well be that various relevant factors should be
carefully and clearly pointed out to the client, perhaps leading to
negotiations and resolution, in the interests of avoiding being a
test case. Uncertainty in the law, and in its application may still
be avoided by a settlement between the parties. The incentive
for settlement, for one or the other of the parties or both, is cer-
tainly increased when the validity of some or all of the legal
framework in which a dispute arises may become the critical
subject in any litigation.
At trial counsel must ensure that the evidence and submis-
sions highlight any possible injustice of particular principles of
law which may be relevant. Obviously, findings of fact and
statements of law or principle by a primary judge will retain
crucial importance even if, the primary judge, as expected, fol-
lows and does not alter a rule of law that is applicable.
For appellate proceedings, it is important to bear in mind
that this may be the final appeal. It is a bold assumption that
the High Court will necessarily grant special leave. The factors
which Brennan C.J. outlines as pertaining in the High Court in
the judicial assessment as to whether the law is just, are also
matters for state or federal appellate courts. All aspects of a
particular law or rule or legislative enactment may need to be
considered in submissions.
Be prepared for rigorous analysis of any submissions pro-
pounding development of legal principle or statutory invalidity.
Be prepared to meet an argument which reflects these recent
remarks by Gleeson C.J.:
66 Sed libera nos a malo: but deliver us from evil.
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[Ilt is wrong to assume that, running throughout the law, there
is some general principle of fairness which will always yield an
appropriate result if only the judge can manage to get close
enough to the facts of the individual case. Much of the policy
behind laws, statutory or judge-made, is based upon other con-
siderations. Some legislation reflects the political influence of a
particular interest group in the community which has used its
power to obtain a redistribution of wealth at the expense of oth-
ers who are, at least for the time being, less influential. A prin-
ciple of law may be just or wise, or convenient, even though it
operates harshly in some cases. What is fair in the context of
one set of facts may be unfair in the context of another. The law
responds to many impulses in addition to the dictates of appar-
ent fairness in individual cases, and these need to be given full
weight in any rational development of the law. 
57
Many counsel have detected a lessening of judicial reliance
on older authority for specific applications of principles of law.
Recent developments, in other areas of the law where analogous
obligations or duties are operative, have become more important.
This includes comparable countries such as United Kingdom,
United States of America, Canada and New Zealand. As well,
international law is a legitimate and important influence on the
development of the common law, especially when international
law declares the existence of universal human rights." Failure
to take any of these matters into account may lead to counsel
being caught short by the bench and/or overwhelmed by the op-
position.
Gleeson, supra note 52, at 432.
See Mabo v. Queensland (No 2), 175 CLR at 42, per Brennan J.; see also Min-
ister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273.
